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Abstract
There is a recent increased examination of the effects of international funding for
truth commissions and criminal tribunals in post-conflict societies as they
transition to peace. The discourse on whether to prioritize truth commissions or
international criminal tribunals and which form of transitional justice more
effectively fosters healing and reconciliation continues to be highly polemical. This
paper explores whether, in terms of post-conflict healing and reconciliation,
international funding would be better spent on truth commissions than on
international criminal tribunals or vice versa. It examines the complexities and
heterogeneity of transitional societies and suggests that international funding for
transitional justice should be less rigid and prescriptive. A victim-centric approach
that takes into account practical realities on the ground should be the driving force
behind the decision to fund particular forms of transitional justice. In the paper,
first, theories of healing and reconciliation are conceptualized. Second, three case
studies involving truth commissions are presented and analyzed. Third, through the
lens of competing arguments on the role of prosecution in terms of healing,
reconciliation, and deterrence, additional country cases involving recent hot-spots
are dissected. Based on the examination of the unique characteristics of these
examples of post-conflict societies, the paper argues that international funding
should be based on wide-ranging factors that are country specific.
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“A wrong is something that ought not to exist and calls to be obliterated. If anyone
is able to remove it, he is obligated to do so or the wrong will also be partly his.”
Wolgast, 1987
Introduction
Wolgast’s message underpins the strong moral need to fight injustice everywhere and to
demand societal accountability when injustice remains unchecked. In post-conflict societies,
healing and reconciliation are fundamental components in forming a solid foundation for
stability, the re-establishment of social norms, democracy, the rule of law, and institutionbuilding. Transitional states must address healing and reconciliation in order to maintain peace in
the aftermath of civil conflicts. Given the magnitude of atrocities committed against innocent
civilian populations during civil conflicts and political repressions, victims are left with severe
physical and emotional scars that make healing and reconciliation elusive. Given the enormity of
the crimes committed, victims’ resentment toward those who caused their suffering is profound.
Resentment, hatred, and a strong need for retribution are understandable. Authorities must
recognize the legitimate grievances of victims and empathize with their unwillingness to forgive
or forget their suffering or relinquish the past. Authorities must work with these individuals and
groups to formulate policies that best ensure healing and reconciliation.
A serious impediment to healing and reconciliation is victims’ awareness that the very
perpetrators of the heinous crimes committed against them continue also to live among them and
usually maintain positions of power in the aftermath of violent civil conflicts. Perpetrators parade
the corridors of governments with impunity and remain at the apexes of the socio-political and
economic pyramids. They possess tremendous power and wealth, typically procured at the
expense of victims’ suffering. Victims are left to deal with their physical and emotional injuries
in the ruins of war and deprivation, often with little material and psychological support. In many
instances, these disparities in economic wealth and other social structures in post-conflict
societies stem from the forced domination and subjugation of civilian populations through the
barrels of guns, and not through credible democratic processes.
Using Amartya Sen’s capability framework, Murphy (2010) identifies violence,
economic oppression, and inequitable constructions of group identity as categories of unjust acts
during civil conflict. These disparities in post-conflict societies must be rectified to ensure
healing and reconciliation. Murphy contends that being recognized and respected at the
individual and group levels as members of a political community and allowing individual
participation in the economic, political, and social life of the community also contribute to
healing and reconciliation. The historical milieu that nurtures the subjugation of groups and the
contemporary forces that connive to ensure continued group suffering are unique in many
instances. Therefore, any form of transitional justice must consider the context in which these
violent acts have occurred.
The discourse regarding the selection and prioritization of the form of transitional justice
that most directly fosters lasting healing and reconciliation continues to be highly polemical.
Truth commissions and international tribunals require millions of dollars and are funded by
national governments, international organizations such as the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations (Knoops, 2006). The international community also facilitates the
judicial process by providing additional judges, lawyers, and forensic investigators. Despite this
international support, truth commissions have remained underfunded (Scharf, 1997) and underresourced, constraining their ability to effectively achieve their specific mandates. Additionally,
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costs and resource needs regarding the implementation of either form of transnational justice are
country specific, yet the implementation of such forms of justice can be prescriptive.
In this paper, we explore whether, in terms of post-conflict healing and reconciliation,
international funding would be better spent on truth commissions than on international criminal
tribunals. We examine the complexities and heterogeneity of transitional societies and suggest
that funding priority for any form of transitional justice should be less rigid and prescriptive and
should adapt to country specific and regional needs to improve ownership of transitional justice
processes. We organize the paper as follows. First, theories of healing and reconciliation are
conceptualized; second, three case studies involving truth commissions are presented and
analyzed; and third, through the lens of competing arguments on the role of prosecution in terms
of healing, reconciliation, and deterrence, additional country cases involving recent hot-spots are
dissected. Based on the examination of the unique characteristics of these countries, the
argument is made that international funding for transitional justice should be based on wideranging factors that are country specific.
Conceptualizing Healing and Reconciliation
Lasting healing and reconciliation are negotiated processes through complex systems that
demand multifaceted approaches. Healing involves transformation from illness to wellness,
enacted through culturally salient practices (Kirmayer, 2004). In the aftermath of violence,
acknowledgement of the historical and political contexts in which the violence occurred is
important for healing. Effective healing practices are embedded in larger cultural systems that
uniquely identify different types of trauma and prescribe appropriate interventions. Healing
practices provide personal, social, religious, and moral significance for experiences of trauma
and recovery. Healing invokes forms of empowerment, including personal feelings of efficacy
and self-control, and larger forms of economic, political, or spiritual power (Kirmayer, 2004).
Staub et al. (2003) notes that healing from the trauma of victimization potentially
prevents victims from engaging in retaliation, revenge, and pre-emptive acts of violence,
especially if perpetrators continue to live among the survivors. In order for reconciliation to
occur, perpetrators must also begin to empathize with the suffering of victims, rather than
continue the dehumanization and exclusion of victims as “the others” or “the enemies.”
Perpetrators must also assume personal responsibility for their actions, rather than continue to
blame the victims or justify their violence using ideological rationalizations. Healing and
reconciliation processes are especially important if victims and perpetrators continue to live
together and are essential in minimizing the likelihood of renewed violence (Staub et al., 2003).
Philpott (2006) defines reconciliation as comprising diverse political processes of
restoring right relationships within a civil society, which does not necessarily involve official
procedures. Murphy (2010) conceptualizes political reconciliation as (a) forgiveness and the
overcoming of widespread negative emotions in order to restore damaged political relationships;
(b) the creation and stabilization of normative expectations and legal trust within a political
community; (c) institutionalizing democratic political values based on free and equal citizenship;
and (d) the constituting of a political community. Further refining the conceptualization of
reconciliation, Hayner (1999) views reconciliation as (a) an assessment of how the past is dealt
with in the public sphere, in order to gauge the influence of the past on political and other public
relationships; (b) the determination of whether relationships between former opponents are based
on present common challenges and interests rather than on the past; and (c) the ability to
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reconcile contradictory facts of the past when they appear in conflict. Reconciling conflicting
historical views leads to the creation of a shared history that can be accepted by both sides and
lessens feelings of blame, mistrust, and antagonism (Staub et al., 2003).
Some form of apology or public recognition of wrongdoing is an essential element of
healing and reconciliation (Kaminer et al., 2001; Hamber, 2007). Bringing perpetrators to justice
is integral to healing and reconciliation (TRC of South Africa, 1998), which are achieved when
justice has been served and the victims are satisfied with the process. Healing and reconciliation
are difficult to achieve when victims are aware that perpetrators continue to enjoy the proceeds
of their actions or occupy advantageous positions in society that stem from past ills and
injustices. Healing and reconciliation are achievable when basic benchmarks of justice and social
justice are met and the shared humanity among different groups in post-conflict societies is
recognized.
Country Case Studies Involving Truth Commissions
South Africa
European settlement in South Africa began in the 17th century. Initially, British and
Dutch settlers engaged in a series of conflicts over land, mineral wealth, indigenous labor, and
political rule. These conflicts culminated in the Boer War of 1899. The conflict ended with the
acceptance of British rule by the Dutch settlers. The government formulated policies with the
intention of marginalizing indigenous black South Africans from the country’s economic system
(Thompson, 2001). Lowenberg and Kaempfer (1998) note that apartheid in South Africa
originated with South Africa’s industrialization during the 1920s and with the ensuing job
competition, which became the driving force of the South African political economy. They note
that low skilled white workers with voting rights were outnumbered by their black competitors,
who lacked similar voting rights and were willing to work for significantly lower wages. In order
to stifle such competition, white workers successfully mobilized government power to enact
successive legislations, formally ushering in a political system of apartheid in 1948, a system
which, by all accounts, ensured the subjugation of other human beings. Communities were
separated based on skin color, and non-whites were relegated to living on unfertile land.
Apartheid existed for more than four decades, with widespread political violence
committed by the ruling white minority and its security apparatus and, to some extent, by those
opposing apartheid. Accounts exist of the state security forces drinking beer and barbequing the
bodies of tortured and killed opposition members. The remains of victims were dispersed in acts
of disappearance in order to render them untraceable. Death squad killings were pervasive.
Children were tortured and killed. Hatred and resentment festered in poor, black communities.
During the transition from apartheid, members of the ruling party feared that
relinquishing power to the African National Congress (ANC), a predominantly black activist
party, would translate into retribution and widespread violence against whites. The apartheid
government negotiated a transitional constitution that ensured amnesty of some form and assured
that a smooth transition would occur, without widespread retribution. Many observers around the
world anticipated a full-blown civil war. South Africans compromised on the creation of a Truth
and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) that would look into past atrocities. It was agreed that
perpetrators would openly confess their human rights abuses and prove that such atrocities were
committed with political motive. Perpetrators did not have to express contrition for their crimes.
Prerequisites for amnesty were limited to public confession and proof that atrocities were
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politically motivated (TRC of South Africa, 1998). The TRC was empowered to grant such
amnesty. A deadline was set for those applying for amnesty and a parallel criminal investigation
was initiated. Those perpetrators refusing to appear before the TRC were denied amnesty and
recommended for prosecution. Although some recommendations were never acted on, some
military officers of the apartheid regime who had participated in human rights abuses were tried
and convicted. Due to the threat of prosecution, rights violators hurried to testify and applied for
amnesty (TRC of South Africa, 1998). However, application for amnesty plummeted after a
high-level trial acquitted a former defense minister and nineteen others for rights abuses,
rendering the threat of incarceration less realistic.
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy illustrates that multiple complex
factors can influence not only the form and direction of transnational justice itself but also the
decision to prioritize a particular form of transitional justice over another. South Africa set out
during the transitional phase to prioritize truth-seeking over prosecution, partly to ensure a
smooth transition and an end to apartheid. In other countries, victims and national governments
aggressively advocated and pursued prosecution of most human rights violators, while in South
Africa, a truth commission ensured some form of closure. The process of healing and
reconciliation may begin with truth commissions, depending on the context and political
opportunities and compromises. The South African TRC, regarded as the paragon of truth
seeking in transitional societies, represented a political compromise that guaranteed a noneventful transfer of power from the minority apartheid regime to a democratic and inclusive
government. While South Africa did not prosecute those who fully cooperated with the TRC, the
country did prosecute those who refused to cooperate. The TRC was a prominent body that
helped to close the dark chapter of apartheid.
Chile

In Chile, after General Augusto Pinochet assumed power in 1973, mass human rights
violations occurred under his regime. Disappearances, torture, and killings were common. People
often did not know the whereabouts of their loved ones. Victims were referred to as “the living
dead,” an oxymoron that speaks to the agony endured by their relatives. Mothers demonstrated
and walked the streets daily with images of their sons and demanded to know their whereabouts.
After Pinochet lost a plebiscite in 1988, he continued to lead the military and to wield
tremendous power. He remained untouchable and answerable to none. A large segment of
society continued to support him and justified his actions as a protection against the spread of
Marxist ideology within the country.
Facing mounting pressures, Pinochet retired as head of the military in 1998 and assumed
his position as an unelected senator for life. Before leaving the presidency, he hurriedly
appointed the majority of Supreme Court judges, whom he expected would decide his fate at a
later date. Pinochet also granted his regime amnesty for atrocities committed from 1973 to 1978,
the period of utmost brutality (US Institute of Peace, 2003). Patricio Aylwin assumed the
presidency in 1990 and constituted a National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the
Rettig Commission) (US Institute of Peace, 1990). Upon releasing the commission’s report,
President Aylwin pleaded with the nation, asking for forgiveness on behalf of rights violators.
The commissioned report did not bring closure to victims; rather, it opened a fierce debate
among opposing sides. Partly due to the polarity of Chilean society concerning the Pinochet
regime’s actions, the new government was weak and could not act decisively.
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However, based on findings by the commission, the Spanish courts issued an arrest
warrant for Pinochet for atrocities committed under his regime (Bianchi, 1999). Based on the
principle of universal jurisdiction, Spanish law allows for the prosecution of human rights
abusers outside of Spain. The Spanish Judicial Power Organization Act 6/1985 allows Spanish
national criminal courts to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and to prosecute certain
categories of crimes, whether or not those crimes were committed outside of Spanish territory
and/or by persons who are not Spanish citizens (United Nations, 2009). The arrest warrant was
an important moment in Pinochet’s demise. In 1998, Pinochet was arrested in London for
extradition to Spain. The extradition process dragged out in the British legal system. Pinochet
was released by a British court in 2000 on grounds that he was medically unfit to stand trial.
Following his return to Chile from London, he was no longer untouchable. Pinochet faced
multiple charges and court appearances until his death (US Institute of Peace, 1990; 2003).
Pinochet’s grip on power after leaving the presidency was sufficient to stall political
reform and prosecution. The commission lacked the power to take action against perpetrators, as
Pinochet continued to wield tremendous influence over the Chilean military and society. The
commission did not have jurisdictional authority and could not interfere with court cases.
Further, it could not compel testimony and could not publicly name perpetrators, which
effectively granted them impunity. However, despite significant limitations on its mandate, the
commission was important in providing information that raised awareness of the scale of
Pinochet’s atrocities and pressured the Chilean courts to bring perpetrators to justice (TRIAL,
2013).
Rwanda
The Rwandan Civil War began in 1990 and ended with the Arusha Peace Accords, signed
by the government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in August 1992. The Peace Accord
instituted a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the
civil war. The commission began its work in 1993. Hundreds of Rwandans presented oral and
written testimonies to the commission, and the commission found systematic human rights
violations in Rwanda during the period under its investigation (1990-1992). Several large-scale
massacres of the Tutsi did occur and were attributed to local officials following orders from their
superiors. Mass graves were discovered. The commission documented rights abuses on both
sides of the conflict. The Rwandan Armed Forces engaged in torture, summary execution, and
the rape and impregnation of girls as young as 12 years old. On the other hand, the RPF attacked
civilian targets, recruited child soldiers, and engaged in forced deportations. There was
widespread violence by both the state and rebel forces, and the judicial system was nonfunctional
(The International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, 1993).
In 1994, genocide ensued after the death of the Hutu President, Juvenal Habyarimana,
when his plane was shot down. In 100 days, an estimated 800,000 people were massacred. The
majority of victims were Tutsi; some moderate Hutus and human right activists considered to be
sympathizers of the Tutsi were also victims. Neighbors were instructed by propaganda radio to
use machetes to hack their neighbors to death. Many ordinary civilians were slaughtered as they
hid under their beds and in churches and as they walked the streets. UN peacekeepers were
ordered to retreat, a decision that Koffi Annan, then head of UN peacekeeping operations and
later Secretary General, stated that he most regretted. The genocide ended when Paul Kigame,
the Tutsi rebel leader and current president, assumed control of Kigali. The UN Security Council
then authorized the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
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Some of those accused of genocide were tried in local courtrooms and executed. Many
remained in pretrial detention; some went under the Gacaca court system (a local form of
community justice), and others were sent to the ICTR that was established and worked from
Arusha, Tanzania. The tribunal remains in place and continues its work. The ICTR tried a few
high and mid-ranking officers who had orchestrated and implemented the genocide. The Kigame
government was displeased that alleged genociders received humane treatment and
comparatively less stringent sentences for their crimes. Under this court, sponsored by the
international community, perpetrators were given the presumption of innocence and appointed
qualified lawyers. Their rights were respected, and, if convicted, they were to serve their prison
sentences in a humane setting. The ICTR allowed witnesses and victims of the genocide to
testify before judicial authorities and raised the international community’s awareness of the
atrocities committed during the genocide (Nsanzuwera, 2005).
The commission of inquiry in Rwanda, which preceded the 1990-1992 Civil War, did not
result in peace. Enduring ethnic tensions and rivalries remained. There were no mechanisms put
in place to address long-standing historical disputes. There were few genuine attempts to heal the
scars of past sufferings or reconcile past differences. The ethno-political and economic divides
remained. The Rwandan commission of inquiry did not foster healing and reconciliation (Human
Rights Watch, 1993). The mayhem and carnage in Rwanda in 1994 serve as stark reminders that
healing and reconciliation can be elusive, even after a formal airing of grievances. There is no
guarantee of peace and security if the structures that foment violence and inequalities in societies
remain intact.
Burnet (2009) notes that even after the 1994 genocide, the RPF forced the repatriation of
close to one million refugees from neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996
and arranged the mass killing of hundreds of thousands more under the guise of the
Banyamulenge rebellion.1 A strategic goal of the Rwandan government in the DRC was
purportedly to prevent the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militant
group founded by perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, from carrying out similar atrocities. The
fluid situation on Rwanda’s border with the DRC conveys the continuous fragility of postconflict peace and security processes and the potential extension of conflict beyond national
borders.
The Role of Prosecution as Deterrence and Fostering of Healing and Reconciliation
Wars were once fought between armies, and civilian populations were spared the carnage
and horrors of the battle field. This conventional understanding of warfare is no longer the norm.
Despite the great human tragedies of the two world wars of the past century, Kim and Sikkink
(2010) note that the total number of people killed by their own governments in the 20th century
exceeds the number of those killed in combat in both world wars combined. The country cases
presented in this study attest not only to this reality but also to the complex nature of civil
conflicts and political repressions. The cases underscore the dilemmas faced by transitional
societies and the international community as to which form of transitional justice to prioritize in
post-conflict nations. Human rights violations committed by these regimes included torture,
extra-judicial execution, massacres, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, shame
trials of political opponents, imprisonment, disappearances, and ethnic cleansing. Hayner (1999)
notes that prescribing the means to achieving healing and reconciliation is difficult if the ends are
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hard to define or measure, impossible to guarantee, and depend in part on circumstances beyond
one’s control.
Many human rights practitioners have advocated for prosecution as a normative response
to rights abuses. They contend that adherence to the rule of law and consistency in judicial
applications are fundamental in ensuring deterrence and satisfying victims’ needs for justice,
thereby contributing to healing and reconciliation (Owen, 2004). In this context, adherence to the
rule of law connotes that wrongdoers are accountable for their actions in a court of law,
irrespective of their status and that tyranny is not condoned and should never go unpunished. For
them, prosecution deters would-be perpetrators of heinous crimes, reduces the severity of
victims’ scars, and ensures lasting reconciliation. Within this context, Mani (2002) writes that
justice is essential for healing trauma, which is a recipe for reconciliation and peace, and Bass
(2005) suggests that victims desperately want punishment for perpetrators.
Further, Kim and Sikkink (2010) find that transitional countries that prosecute human
rights violators and countries with neighbors that prosecute human rights violators are less
repressive. Their argument supports the view that deterrence can be achieved by prosecuting
perpetrators of atrocious acts or that deterrence is possible by the mere threat of prosecution of
would-be perpetrators. Legal scholars and political philosophers have grappled with the question
as to whether an “eye for an eye” can ensure deterrence for future offenders or healing of the
wounds of victims. From this perspective, accountability is not merely about retributive justice;
it is also about preventing future crimes and about saving future generations from the scourge of
violence. If this thesis is accepted, then it can be expected that recurrent acts of violence will
decrease as prosecution increases. This would create a political space to foster healing and
reconciliation as time elapses.
Recent evidence in international justice suggests that the threat of prosecution is not an
entirely effective deterrence strategy. For example, the former president of Liberia, Charles
Taylor, and the president of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, have both been indicted by
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The former was successfully
prosecuted, while the latter is still at large. However, the immediate neighbors of both Liberia
and Sudan continued to engage in acts of atrocity against their civilian populations. Taylor’s trial
at The Hague did not dissuade political leaders in Liberia’s neighboring countries, Guinea and
Cote d’Ivoire, from engaging in serious acts of violence against innocent civilian populations. In
fact, these incidents occurred during the period of Taylor’s trial.
Amnesty International reported that on September 28, 2010, more than 150 people were
massacred, 1,500 were injured, and scores of women were publicly raped by security forces as
peaceful demonstrators gathered in a stadium in Guinea. Social media and international news
organizations showed graphic images of the violence. In 2011, post-election violence in Cote
d’Ivoire reached a low point when forces loyal to then-president Gbagbo fired on unarmed
female protestors. Responding to the violence in Cote D’Ivoire, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of
State at the time, asserted that such action demonstrated “a callous disregard for human life and
the rule of law” and that it “[preyed] on the unarmed and innocent” (US Embassy, Abidjan,
2011). Hundreds of civilian deaths followed, with reports of mercenaries coming from
neighboring Liberia. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (2011) denounced the violence in Cote
d’Ivoire as “a direct consequence of Mr. Gbagbo’s refusal to relinquish power and allow a
peaceful transition to [then elected] President Ouattara.” In 2011, Gbagbo was transferred to the
ICC’s custody for his role in the post-election carnage.
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Similarly, despite the ICC’s arrest warrant for Sudanese President Al-Bashir, neighboring
Chad and Libya committed serious crimes against their people. Amnesty International (2009)
documented that security forces in Chad murdered and tortured their own people and called on
the government to investigate these crimes. In 2011, the Libyan government was alleged to have
killed hundreds of civilians during anti-government protests (Amnesty International, 2011). The
former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and his son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, were also indicted
by the ICC for war crimes against the Libyan people. Further, the Syrian regime was not deterred
by the ICC indictment of the Gaddafis. These cases suggest that actual or perceived prosecution
by international tribunals does not entirely deter regimes from committing human rights abuses.
The pendulum on international prosecution has not settled. It should not be surprising that
tribunals do not entirely deter crime, just as prosecutions do not entirely deter common street
crime. Of additional concern are the suggestions that the ICC targets countries in the global south
and that decisions on transitional justice may in part be reflective of the power asymmetry
between the north and south (International Criminal Court, 2013). These issues highlight that
prosecution is neither the sole means of deterrence nor the only path to ensure healing and
reconciliation or peace and security. This analysis does not by any means imply, however, that
the international community should abandon the court system. Rather, it highlights the need for
new innovation in international jurisprudence—an innovation that is less prescriptive and more
adaptive to situations on the ground.
The Role of Truth Commissions in Fostering Healing and Reconciliation
Truth commissions can be therapeutic, or they can be counter-productive. Advocates for
truth commissions contend that the power of truth can ameliorate victims’ pain and forge healing
and reconciliation. Hayner’s (2002) faith in truth-telling resonates when she warns, “Bury your
sins, and they will reemerge later. Stuff skeletons in the closet, and they will fall back out of the
closet at the most inauspicious time. Try to quiet the ghosts of the past, and they will haunt you
forever” (p. 30). Yet Murphy (2010) cautions that sometimes “truth commissions can descend
into a public forum for settling old scores and for airing grudges, prejudices, and incidents
tangentially related to the mandate of the commission (p. 162)… and may instead become a
forum for recrimination and revenge, further entrenching denial and division” (p. 163).
Current arguments regarding the most effective form of transitional justice are based on a
prevailing notion that truth commissions are tantamount to amnesty and tribunals to retribution.
This dominant mode of thought derives from the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. As Hayner (2002) notes, however, truth commissions do not necessarily result in
amnesty. She cites the 1995 Burundi conflict in which the UN Special Envoy to Burundi called
for the establishment of a truth commission to investigate past abuses but was met with
resistance because of the widespread belief that truth commissions signified amnesty. This
prompted the Special Envoy to refer to such a body as a Commission of Inquiry, which was then
accepted. Findings from truth commissions potentially serve as precursors to amnesty or
prosecution. These forms of transitional justice are not mutually exclusive.
The selection of truth commissions, international tribunals, or local prosecution depends
on the protractability of the violence, the intensity of the conflict, and the scale and numbers of
both victims and perpetrators of violence. In violent conflicts wherein vast segments of the
society are victims or perpetrators, neither the state nor the international community can afford to
prosecute all who participated in gross human rights violations. For example, in times of conflict,
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children are besieged to commit acts of violence with immense barbarity. Certainly, many would
agree that there is little comparison between atrocities committed by child soldiers under the
influence of psychoactive drugs and the leaders who orchestrate violent acts, purchase weapons,
and voluntarily participate in widespread atrocity. Given the status of infrastructures, the
availability of resources, and the level of wide-spread past violations, post-conflict societies and
the international community also lack the capacity to prosecute every perpetrator; with resource
scarcities and serious competing priorities, the international community simply cannot afford to
incarcerate sizable segments of post-conflict societies. Arguably, at the very least, although
selective prosecution for atrocities committed on a large-scale is unfair, measures such as
prosecution of top-ranking officials—if not all perpetrators—can be implemented instead of
granting total amnesty.
Ideally, when atrocities are committed, the law should be non-selective in application,
and all offenders should be prosecuted, as prosecuting only some can be considered unfair.
However, pragmatically, it is impossible to prosecute all offenders. When events on the ground
are conducive, high-level perpetrators should be considered for prosecution at the local or
international level. Thus, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2007) argues that compared to international
tribunals, truth commissions are more appealing because of their low cost.
Conclusions: Employing Diverse and Victim Centered Approaches to Transitional Justice
Transitional justice must employ victim-centric approaches that account for practical
realities on the ground. Asserting that international funding in post-conflict settings is more
effectively spent on truth commissions than on international criminal tribunals or vice versa is a
perilous prescription that cannot treat all the maladies of post-conflict societies. Policies more
likely to foster lasting healing and reconciliation are numerous and vary in different settings.
These policies or courses of action include the establishment of truth commissions; the
prosecution of ring-leaders of groups that have committed heinous crimes against civilian
populations in local or international courts; lustrations; and reparations for victims of economic
injustices. Healing and reconciliation processes differ for individuals, groups, societies, and
nations, yet they are critical components of peace, security, and the reestablishment of functional
societal norms. Members of post-conflict societies, including both victims and perpetrators, must
engage in healing and reconciliation processes, adopt mechanisms for conflict resolution, and
work to prevent the occurrence of future conflicts. They must work to resettle and reintegrate all
persons into society. If adequate settlement is not available for victims, then the propensity exists
for self-seeking or vigilante retributive justice, which could lead to further conflict.
Although truth commissions should be encouraged, the international community should
not entirely rule out prosecution for high-level officials who orchestrate and commit crimes
against humanity. International tribunals play an important role in providing a forum for legal
proceedings in a court of law that has been duly authorized to render judicial dispositions and
sanctions. Truth commissions are not authorized to provide these kinds of judicial actions. In
circumstances in which prosecution is feasible and victims are keen to such, the international
community must focus on international tribunals that enable the prosecution of such perpetrators
at an international institution, without fear on the part of national leaders of nascent and fragile
governments of repercussions from their followers. Based on the unique nature of each situation,
funding could be directed to truth commissions if they ensure healing and reconciliation, or to
tribunals if they satisfy victims’ quest for justice and ensure healing and reconciliation. Truth
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commissions, which are non-judicial, and international tribunals, which are judicial in nature, are
complementary processes that are most effectively articulated based on the national contexts and
needs of the particular society seeking to foster healing and reconciliation. The international
community should evaluate the cultural, political, and historical contexts of the society and work
with national governments to determine the appropriate course of action that is victim-centric.
Healing and reconciliation do have different parameters in different cultures. A one-size fits all
model cannot be applied in all circumstances.
Goldstone (1998) argues that criminal litigation and non-judicial commissions can
coexist and that truth commissions can help the tribunal clarify the broader context within which
atrocities were committed. These processes work in concert or separately to prevent or break the
vicious cycle of recurrent violence and to create an environment that nurtures healing and
reconciliation. The debate over the efficacy of truth commissions and amnesty versus
prosecution and purge (and vice versa) is passionate, with each side producing convincing
arguments. Both forms of transnational justice involve dynamic and evolving processes and are
not singular events. Despite the passionate debates regarding which form of justice to prioritize,
it should be noted that healing and reconciliation have not been the principle aims of truth
commissions and international criminal tribunals. Truth commissions collect large amounts of
data on gross human rights abuses; conduct analyses on how such cataclysmic political violence
is set into motion; statistically analyze patterns of abuses; name, in some cases, perpetrators of
abuses; and make recommendations for reparations, institutional reforms, and prosecution. In
contrast, international tribunals are primarily concerned with personal accountability and
deterrence. However, both forms of transitional justice have the potential to foster healing and
reconciliation. As such, forms of healing and reconciliation should be intrinsic, with victims
engaged in deciding what is appropriate. These determinations depend on multiple factors, which
are at times inter-related and at times conflicting, and the international community should respect
and facilitate such processes. Determinations should be based on fairness for victims. Putting the
interests of the victims as primary and recognizing what the victim perceives as a satisfactory
form of justice (as opposed to the simple implementation of a prescriptive solution) should be
central to healing and reconciliation processes.
This paper has argued that healing and reconciliation cannot be viewed through a singular
lens. Post-conflict societies differ in many aspects; it is imperative that policy-makers understand
these differences in order to make informed judgments as to forms of transitional justice that
facilitate healing and reconciliation. International funding should focus on truth commissions
when human rights violations are widespread and systemic and should focus on prosecution for
those at the top of command and most responsible for heinous crimes. Justice must be victimcentric. This prioritization fosters healing and reconciliation; serves as deterrence for present and
future generations; prevents vigilante justice; legitimizes the current regime; and paves the way
for closure of past wrongdoing.
Countries employ diverse means in confronting past human rights violations. Strategies
to be applied in a particular post-conflict society that ensure healing and reconciliation are
contextualized and account for factors that are characteristic of the specific society. These
strategies depend on country specificities, including historical and political experiences, the level
of violence committed, economic wealth, and political will. However, these specificities do not
exclude existing universal standards and outcomes, such as some form of accountability for
orchestrators and perpetrators of the most egregious human rights violations and a sense of
fairness and justice for victims and their families. Sriram (2004) eloquently captures these
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complexities by noting that “some states may need public articulation of the truth, some states
amnesty, some states prosecution, and most a complex admixture of several” (p. 13).
Historically, transitional societies have employed various forms of transitional justice with
varying rates of success. This is an emerging field, and analysis of the past is still in its infancy.
1

The Banyamulenge minority group, consisting primarily of ethnic Tutsis, is marginalized within Congolese society.
An intent of the Banyamulenge Rebellion was to combat extremist Hutu forces that continued to engage in
genocidal practices. The rebellion garnered widespread public support against Mobutu’s authoritarian regime and
evolved into a general revolution (Afoaku, 2002).
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